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The Norwegian political business cycle
Leif Hellandy
Abstract
The arcticle explores the political business cycle in Norway from
the early 1980s onwards. It is shown that unemployment growth is
related to uncertainty about likely parliamentary majorities, and to
the level of political conict between such majorities. Data indicate
that voter expectations are formed on the basis of likely majority
winners in votes, not in seats. Unemployment growth is unrelated to
sudden and unpredictable changes in the composition of government.
This suggests that the instruments inuencing unemployment growth
are within the domain of the legislative, not the executive, power.
Constructive comments to an early draft was generously provided by Kai Leitemo,
Espen Moen, Christian Riis and Rune Sørensen. Helpful suggestions from two anonymous
referees is greatly appreciated .
yNorwegian School of Management BI, Nydalsveien 37, 0442 Oslo, E-mail:
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1 Introduction
In rational partisan theory (RPT) the economy is described by a Lucas sup-
ply side function, rational expectations, and nominal rigidities in wage and
price contracting (Alesina 1987, 1988). Partisan di¤erences are assumed to
exist. In particular, growth in output and employment above the natural rate
is valued more by leftist than rightist parties.1 After an election, therefore,
leftist (rightist) majority-winners inate the economy at a higher (lower) rate
than rightist (leftist) majority-winners, and a post electoral boom (bust) is
generated. The e¤ect is temporary and fades away as existing wage and price
contracts are replaced. The more surprising the election result is, and the
more the parties di¤er in their valuation of employment, the stronger is the
electoral impact.
RPT assume that partisan preferences are stable across electoral periods.
Empirically, this is a questionable assumption.2 Party manifestos are rewrit-
ten prior to each campaign, and are subject to interpretations after elections.3
As a result partisan preferences tend to vary across as well as within elec-
toral periods. The model in section 2 exposes partisan preferences to random
exogenous shocks, inducing variance over time. Variation in partisan pref-
erences is controlled for in the empirical specications of section 3. It turns
out that such variation is a powerful predictor of partisan cycles.
1Leftist parties may also care less than rightist parties about the costs of ination, but
such a di¤erence is not necessary to drive the results.
2As emphasized by, for instance, Franzese and Jusko (2006).
3Manifestos are naturally viewed as incomplete contracts between the party congress
(the principal) and elected representatives that make the decisions (the agents). Consid-
erable variation in manifestos over time has been demonstrated, see for instance, Benoit
et al. (2009) with references.
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A number of tests of RPT exist. One approach is to capture post-electoral
business cycles by interventions that are turned on in t periods following
an election (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal
1993, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997: chapters 4 and 6). Another ap-
proach consists in comparing average growth and unemployment rates the
rst year(s) after elections with average growth and unemployment rates
during the preceding two years (Paldam 1991, Paldam 1997). More sophis-
ticated tests of RPT depart from surprise variables based on expectations
about future policymakers. A common approach is to extract expectations
about majority winners from vote-shares obtained by alternative majorities
in polls using an options pricing model (Alesina et al. 1997: chapter 5, Cohen
1993, Carlsen and Pedersen 1999).4 An objection to this approach is that
policy is decided by a majority of seats, not a majority of votes. Depend-
ing on the specics of electoral rules, seat- shares may deviate substantially
from vote-shares.5 For this reason we examine, in section 3, the robustness of
RPT to changing the expectations argument from votes to seats. It turns out
that electoral surprises based on votes, rather than on seats, have the most
pronounced e¤ects on unemployment growth in our data. This is somewhat
puzzling.
4An alternative is to use data from election-markets, as for instance in Fowler (2006).
Election market data are not available for Norway over the period in question. Another
sophisticated approach is to t a set of regressions across elections, explaining the incum-
bents vote share as a function of both opinion polls and macroeconomic variables. The
predictions can then be used to compute election win probabilities for the incumbent.
Chappell and Keech (1988) provides the pioneering work of this approach, while Carlsen
and Pedersen (1999) represents a more recent application. The approach presumes some
kind of retrospective voting based on economic performance of incumbents, which is not
a part of RPT. Consequently, we do not use this approach.
5For instance, after 1945 eight di¤erent governments held a majority of the seats in
the Norwegian parliament, none of which had a majority of the popular vote in national
elections.
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Traditionally, at least since Paldams seminal article in 1979, the decision
maker of interest in RPT is assumed to be the government. For this to give
good meaning arbitrary restrictions have to be placed on data generated by
parliamentary democracies.6 In this paper we take a di¤erent view, and as-
sume that the parliamentary majority is the decision-maker of interest. This
does away with the need for arbitrary restrictions on the data.
At the same time, governments are routinely replaced outside the electoral
cycle in parliamentary systems. Such replacements constitute genuine sur-
prises. For non-electoral replacements to produce political cycles govern-
ments must possess some amount of independent policy-making power. We
investigate the policy-making powers of governments, by checking for the
macroeconomic e¤ects of non-electoral replacements. Such replacements do
not have business cycle e¤ects in our data, indicating that macroeconomic
policy is placed rmly within the domain of parliamentary majorities in Nor-
way.
Monthly unemployment data from the early 1980s onwards are used to check
for the presence of a rational partisan business cycle. Existing tests employ
yearly or quarterly data. Using monthly data allows us to keep better track
of political events, and provides us with statistical power in series of relatively
short duration. Series of short duration decreases the probability of drawing
data from di¤erent politico-economic regimes. This makes short duration
6See, for instance, Paldam (1979:326): "In order to conduct a statistical study some
very clear-cut criteria have to be found to decide whether a government is stable. Two
rules have been used. They must both be fullled. Rule 1: The government should have a
parliamentary majority. Rule 2: The government remains in power throughout the normal
election period."
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data desirable. In addition, Norwegian data are of course particularly suited
to a test of the RPT, since Norway is the only western parliament with a
xed election term (as assumed in RPT).7
The article is organized as follows. The next section contains the model,
while section three describes the data. Section four confronts model and
data. Section ve o¤ers some conclusions.
2 Model
The economy is described by a simple supply function:8
ut = u
 + wt   t (1)
In (1) ut is the realized change in unemployment in period t, u is the (time
invariant) natural rate of unemployment,  is ination, and wt is nominal
wage growth. The ruling majority is assumed to control the ination rate.
It is further assumed that t is an election period, and that elections are held
every second period. Nominal wage contracts are signed at the beginning of
7RPT was developed as an explanation of the US cycle, in which electoral terms are
xed. Subsequently RPT has been tested on cross country samples, in which many of the
countries do not have xed terms. Apart from Norway, the only western parliamentary
democracy that approaches a xed term is Sweden after 1993. The qualifyer "approaches"
is due to the fact that, formally, the Swedish Riksdag can be dissolved. However, the new
Riksdag only lives for the remainder of the original, xed, four year term. For this reason,
Sweden is often characterized as a xed term system, despite the fact that parliament
may be dissolved. The Norwegian Storting cannot be dissolved during the xed four year
election term. For empirical work on RPT in systems without xed terms, see Ito (1990),
Carlsen & Pedersen (1999), Alesina, Cohen & Roubini (1993).
8For micro-foundations and interpretations c.f. Blanchard and Fischer (1989, chapter
8).
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t before the election result is known, and terminate at the end of t.
Ination is rationally expected and wage setters aim at keeping real wages
stable, so that wt = 2t = E(tjIt 1), where I is the information set. I in-
cludes every decision-relevant fact known at time t-1 (including the structure
of the model that follows). Thus, (1) can be rewritten:
ut = u
 + 2t   t (2)
There are two, ideologically immobile, electoral alternatives - or blocks - for
which the votes may be cast; these are denoted k=(Socialist, Conservative).9
The alternatives have loss functions dened over unemployment growth and
ination:
`kt =
1X
t=0
t

 kt ut  
1
2
 
t   k
2
(3)
In (3)  < 1 is the common discount factor, kt > 0 is the marginal cost of
higher unemployment and k is target ination, with Soc  Con  0.
As a slight modication of standard RPT, let kt be a stochastic variable
in the range (t; t). We take 
k
t to be determined by independent and iden-
tical draws from a unimodal and symmetric distribution with mean ekt . This
ensures that historical ination rates do not convey information about future
9The electoral alternatives might be candidates, parties, parliamentary governments
or legislative majorities (in seats or in votes). In the empirical analysis of the paper we
focus on legislative majorities. The formalization that follows reduces the maximization
problem to a one-dimensional choice. One may ask why the parties do not converge on
the median position on this dimension. Several answers may be given. A good overview
of partial convergence results is given by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, chapter 2).
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ination rates.
Let G(kt ) be the cumulative distribution function of 
k
t , with correspond-
ing density g(kt ). Assume that 
Soc
t > 
Con
t . With this assumption, optimal
ination rates (to be determined) will obey the condition Cont < 
Soc
t 8t
(while allowing for variation in kt due to random shocks). The larger is
g(et), of course, the smaller are the shocks.
For any pair (
0Soc
t ; 
0Con
t ) that satises (
0Soc
t   Soct ) = (
0Con
t   Cont ), it
is assumed that g(
0Soc
t ) = g(
0Con
t ). Or in words, the distribution around the
mean of the optimal ination rate is identical for the electoral alternatives.
For this reason risk attitudes do not inuence wage setting.
The draw of kt is revealed for every player when a winner sets policy. Policy
is set after elections in election periods, and after wage contracts have been
signed in non-election periods.
The model is solved using a backwards induction argument.10 Inserting (2) in
(3) and maximizing with respect to t we obtain the optimal rates of ination:
kt = 
k
t + 
k = t (4)
In what follows we set Soc = Con = 0 without loss of generality. Voters
are assumed to have loss functions of the type presented in (3), and to vary
in their optimal ination rates. Votes are cast for the electoral alternative
promising the smallest loss. There is uncertainty about the distribution of
10Intra-party conicts due to last term e¤ects for some members are assumed away. For
an overlapping generation model where such e¤ects are taken account of, see Alesina and
Spear (1988).
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optimal ination rates in the voter population, and the electoral outcome
is therefore uncertain. Let P signify the probability that the socialist block
gains a majority in the upcoming election.11 The expected (post-election)
ination rate for period t is then:
2t = PeSoct + (1  P )eCont (5)
In period t+1 the majority in charge is common knowledge, and contracts
are based on either 2t+1 = eSoct or 2t+1 = eCont depending on which block
won the election in t.
Finally, inserting [5] and [4] in [2] provides the unemployment-growth equa-
tions for the two electoral alternatives:
uSoct = u
 + (1  P )(eCont   Soct )  0 (6)
uCont = u
   P (Cont   eSoct )  0 (7)
Thus, a change in the rate of unemployment can either be caused by an elec-
toral surprise (in an election period), or a random shock due to intra-party
bargaining over the marginal costs of unemployment (in any period). The
central implication is that unemployment increases (decreases) following a
conservative (socialist) victory. This e¤ect is stronger: a) the more unlikely
(likely) a socialist victory is, and b) the more pronounced the political con-
ict between the two blocs is.
11Roemer (1992) derives this probability from primitives (c.f. also Alesina and Cukier-
man (1990) for some special results).
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With added costs in terms of notational complexity the model may be ex-
tended to a multi period setting (Carlsen and Pedersen 1999). This formalizes
the nature of the post-electoral cycle, where the e¤ect of a surprise gradually
fades away as contracts are rewritten. Since this aspect is quite intuitive, we
content ourselves by dealing with it in the empirical specications.
3 Data
Our electoral data cover 342 months, starting with 1976:12 and ending with
2005:05. The electoral alternatives are dened in terms of socialist and non-
socialist majorities.12 As socialist parties we include the Labor party and
every party to the left of it on the left-right scale of politics, as tapped by
voter self-placements in National election surveys.13
Two kinds of expectations are computed: the probability of having a so-
cialist majority in votes after the upcoming election, and the probability
12Party orderings across studies using various methods (expert placements; voter self
placements; manifesto analysis) are generally not stable in studies of Norway. Instability in
orderings may indicate signicant multi-dimensionality. However, demonstrated instablity
may also be due to methodological problems. Rasch (2003) departs from a consistent social
choice framework, and shows that this produces estimates of ideal-points in the Storting
that are stable and ordered on a single dimension. This dimension is interpreted as the
standard left-right dimension in politics. In our context, which is limited to partisan views
on the desirability of scal activism, a traditional ordering on the left -right dimension
seems defensible.
13Obtainable at Norwegian Social Science Data Services (http://www.nsd.uib.no/). We
count as socialist parties: Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Ventreparti) and Labor Party
(Arbeiderpartiet). The remainder is counted as non-socialist: Center Party (Senterpar-
tiet); Liberal Party (Venstre); Christian Peoples Party (Kristelig folkeparti); Conservative
Party (Høyre); and Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet).
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of having a socialist majority in seats after the upcoming election.14 Both
computations depart from monthly polls.15 To calculate the probability of
a socialist majority in seats, polls are rst transformed into seats using the
program CELIUS. The program takes into account various (minor) changes
in electoral rules that have been implemented during the period.16
For any given month the vote-shares (seat-shares) of the socialist parties
are added. The probability of a socialist majority vote-share (seat-share) in
the election  t months ahead is then computed applying the option pricing
method.17 Norwegian national elections are xed, and occur in September
at four-year intervals (so    t ranges between 0 and 48 months).
The probability of a socialist majority in the upcoming election, Pt, is con-
tingent on the number of months remaining before the election, the current
vote-share (seat-share) of the socialist block (xSoct = Socialist seatshare;
Socialist voteshare), the mean monthly change in the polls t, and the
standard deviation of month-to-month changes in the polls t. The mean
14The Norwegian system is fairly stable in terms of proportionality over the time period
in question (approximately score 5 on the simple Gallager (1991) disproportionality index
normalized on 0 to 100). Nontheless, small deviations in partisan vote shares on a national
basis may produce big and surprising shifts in partisan seat shares (due to aggregation of
votes from 19 districts with geographical disproportionality in seats through a complicated
formula). The result, as is evident from gures 1a and 1b below, is that the probability of
a socialist majority in seats and votes respectively deviates quite substantially, despite sta-
bility in proportionality at the national level. It is the probability of electoral replacement
that is of central concern in RPT.
15Recorded by MMI on a monthly basis since 1976:12.
16Program developed by Bernt Aardal at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo
(http://home.online.no/ b-aardal/).
17Pioneered by Black and Scholes (1973), and introduced to political economy by Cohen
(1993).
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and standard deviation of changes are calculated using a cumulative moving
average technique, utilizing data from the rst available poll (1976:12) up to
and including the present month (t).
Vote-shares (seat-shares) are converted into probabilities for a socialist ma-
jority by the following formula, where  signies the standardized, cumula-
tive, normal distribution (and movements in the polls are assumed to be i.i.d):
Pt = 

xSoct + t   0:5
t
p


(8)
Figure 1a displays the probability of a socialist majority in votes, and the
socialist vote share on a month-to-month basis. Figure 1b displays the cor-
responding probability of a socialist majority in seats, and the socialist seat
share on a month-to-month basis.
[Figures 1a and 1b about here]
From the estimated probabilities of a socialist majority in the upcoming
election our surprise variable is constructed in the following way:
Electoral Surprise = DSoct  
1
N
N 1X
i=0
Pt i (9)
In (9) N is the length of a nominal wage contract and DSoct is a dummy that
takes the value one after a socialist victory, and zero after a non-socialist vic-
tory. Since we lack rm knowledge about the precise term structure of wage
contracts, we assume that they are signed uniformly across time. The surprise
variable captures the expected post-electoral change in employment, with a
positive sign for socialist majorities and a negative sign for non-socialist ma-
11
jorities. The magnitude of the surprise determines the magnitude of the
e¤ect on employment, and as contracts are rewritten the e¤ects of the elec-
toral surprise on employment fades away.
We follow the convention of denoting a surprise variable calculated on the
probability of a socialist vote share (V ote Surprise)t, while a surprise variable
calculated on the probability of a socialist seat share is denoted (Seat Surprise)t.
The surprise variables are based on nominal wage contracts of 24 months du-
ration, and 12 months lag for policy to work. Both choices are based on best
t in our data.
According to (6) and (7) the e¤ect on employment also depends (multi-
plicatively) on the magnitude of partisan disagreements.18 We capture the
magnitude of such disagreements by a measure based on fractional statements
by the Labor party and the Conservative party - the two major parties in
each bloc - on budgetary matters in parliament.19 Only statements recorded
in the Finance committee are used.20 The Finance committee is the coordi-
nating committee in the parliaments economic policy making, and economic
policy making is primarily made in the budget.21
18Since the theoretical model suggests a multiplicative term, we include this product
alone rather than specifying the full interaction model. This is in line with for instance
the specications used by Alesina et al. (1997:198) to model the multiplicative e¤ects of
partisanship and election in business cycle models. Further discussion on the appropriate-
ness of including the product alone is given by Kam & Franzese (2007:99-102).
19Data on fractional statements have been used in previous studies by, amongst others,
Scha¤er (1998) and Rommetvedt (2003), to describe distances between legislative parties
and coalitions in the Storting.
20Obtainable at Norwegian Social Science Data Services (http://www.nsd.uib.no/).
21Norwegian parliamentary committees are organized along party lines, and deviations
from the party line are very rare occurrences.
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Denote fractional statements (statements from the majority and minorities)
that both parties participate in by Sij, while statements that only one of
the two parties participates in is denoted Si and Sj respectively. Dene the
statement score of party i as Si
Si+Sij
 fi, and the corresponding statement
score of party j as Sj
Sj+Sij
 fj. The statement scores are simply the fraction
of statements that one party did not have in common with the other party.
The disagreement score of the two parties is dened as:
0  1
2
(fi;t + fj;t)  (Disagreement)t  1 (10)
The score in (10) is calculated on an annual basis, but follows parliamentary
sessions from June to June rather than the calendar year.
One may of course suspect that the disagreement score varies with the parlia-
mentary base of governments, through the oppositions incentives to produce
statements. To check for this suspicion we regress the disagreement score on
dummies for coalition governments and majority governments, as well as a
time trend:
Disagreement =   :411
[ 4:91]
+ :016Coalition
[1:08]
  :035Majority
[ 1:36]
+ :001t
[10:88]
(11)
The estimate is based on robust regression for years greater than 1978 (the
rst year OECD data on changes in G7 unemployment are made available,
and where our analysis starts). As can be seen, only the constant and the
time trend are signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels (t-values
are reported in brackets). The F-statistic for the model is highly signicant.
With this as a background, we use the product of the disagreement score
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in (10) and the surprise variable in (9) to capture the implications of RPT,
as they are stated in (6) and (7).
There are four replacements of governments outside of elections in our data.22
They all go in a leftist direction as measured by party-voters self-placements
in National Election Surveys. In June 1983 the Conservative Partys (CoP)
minority government was supplemented with the Center Party (CeP) and
the Christian Peoples Party (CPP). In May 1986 a non-socialist minority
coalition composed of CoP, CeP and CPP was replaced by a minority gov-
ernment consisting of the Labor Party (LP). In October 1990 a non-socialist
minority coalition composed of the CoP, CeP and the CPP was replaced by
a minority government consisting of the LP. Finally, in April 2000 a non-
socialist minority coalition composed of the CeP, CPP and the Liberal Party
was replaced by a minority government consisting of LP.
Replacements of this kind are genuine surprises that cannot be predicted
with any condence ex ante. To the extent that governments possess dis-
cretionary powers to inate (deate) the economy and increase (decrease)
employment, one would expect them to exploit genuine surprises created
by replacements outside of elections. Denote the measure of replacement-
surprises (Gov   change)t. Since all replacements in our data go to the left
we may dene this measure as:
(Gov   Change)t =
T+N 1X
t=T
1
N
(12)
In (12) t=T is the month of government replacement. The measure starts
22Remember that there are only ve elections in the data set, so the data are not
particularly biased in favor of governmental change in elections.
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out with unity in t=T, and is reduced by increments of 1/N each month
until month t=T+N where all contracts have been rewritten and the mea-
sure reaches a steady state of zero. The measure captures the idea that a
surprise government can fully exploit existing contracts until they are rewrit-
ten, provided that it has the discretionary powers to set policy independent
of the current parliamentary majority. Since we are looking at a socialist
surprise, the e¤ect on changes in employment is taken to be positive. To en-
sure comparability with the electoral surprise variables calculated from (9),
Government change is also based on contract lengths of 24 months and a lag
of 12 months for policy to work.
Our last political variables are a set of intervention terms that are turned
on in the twelve, nine, and six months preceding an election respectively.
The intervention terms are labeled Dt(Election  12), Dt(Election  9) and
Dt(Election   6) (with obvious reference). They represent controls for an
opportunistic cycle, in which any ruling majority will try to create a pre elec-
toral boom in order to get reelected (Nordhaus 1975, Linbeck 1976, Clark et
al. 1998, Clark and Hallerberg 2000).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for relevant variables. A few things
are worth noting. Firstly, the surprise variables (calculated on the basis
of votes as well as seats) have maximums at zero. Thus, there where no
surprising socialist majorities during the period in question. The reason is
simply that no socialist majority in either seats or votes materialized in the
period analyzed. Secondly, the variable capturing extra-electoral government
changes has a maximum of 0.5 and a minimum of zero. The reason is that
such changes are assumed to be genuinely surprising, that all such changes
in the period go in the left direction (+1), and that a contract length is 24
months, but policy only starts working 12 months after an election. Lastly,
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Norwegian unemployment growth has wider extreme bounds and lager stan-
dard deviations than unemployment growth in the G7 countries. This is
so rstly because we calculate percentage growth, and because the unem-
ployment level in the G7 countries far exceeds the Norwegian unemployment
level. Secondly, the standard deviation of the G7 growth is the standard
deviation of an average, which tends to bring it down.
Observations Mean STD Min Max
ut 281 .046 .242 -.310 1.042
Ut 281 4.26 1.37 1.90 6.80
uGt
7 281 -.005 .066 -.113 .220
Seat-surpriset 281 -.015 .036 -.207 .000
Vote-surpriset 281 -.005 .014 -.103 .000
Gov-changet 281 .036 .106 .000 .500
Disagreementt 281 .536 .124 .300 .810
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 1982:01 - 2005:05
Figure 2 displays timelines for our three central independent variables:
the surprise variables calculated on the basis of (9) for seat-shares and vote-
shares respectively, and the disagreement score calculated on the basis of
(10). The vertical lines represent election dates.
[Figure 2 about here]
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4 Results
The following econometric specication is used:
ut = 0 + Ut +
48X
t=1
iut i +
48X
t=0
iu
G7
t i + 'POLITICS + "t (13)
In the specication Ut is the level of Norwegian unemployment, ut is the
change in Norwegian unemployment, uG7t is the change in unemployment in
the G7 countries, 'POLITICS represents the vectors of coe¢ cients and
variables capturing politically relevant variables, and "t is an error term as-
sumed to be iid with zero expectation. Both Norwegian and G7 us are mea-
sured as annualized changes in the unemployment rate, that is, ut  Ut Ut 12Ut 12 .
Since G7 unemployment data start in 1978:01, and since we employ a lag of
48 months, our analysis starts in 1982:01. Observations end in 2005:05. The
data set contains ve elections (1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2001). Monthly
polls back to 1976:12 are utilized in the calculation of win-probabilities.
The vector of politics includes measures of electoral surprise based on socialist
vote-shares and seat-shares respectively, genuine surprises following govern-
ment replacements outside elections, disagreement scores based on fractional
statements, and intervention terms capturing pre-electoral months.
The usual time series techniques where employed. Dicky-Fuller tests for
stationarity where carried out, and autocorrelation was accounted for by lag-
ging the dependent variable. The optimal number of lags was determined
by the Breusch-Goodfrey Lagrange multiplier test. Finally, we estimated the
regressions by maximum likeliehood, using robust standard errors, in order
to weed out heteroscedasticity. Results are presented in Table 2.
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Note rst that the coe¢ cients of both surprise variables have signs in accor-
dance with RPT, and are signicant at conventional levels (models I and III):
The more the election result deviates from expectations, the more unemploy-
ment growth changes. This is in opposition to Carlsen and Pedersen (1999),
who fails to nd signicant e¤ects of RPT using quarterly Norwegian out-
put data from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. In our data a non-socialist
surprise signicantly accelerates unemployment growth, while a socialist sur-
prise signicantly decelerates it. The coe¢ cient of surprises calculated on
the basis of vote-shares are almost two and a half times as strong as the co-
e¢ cient of surprises calculated on the basis of seat-shares. This is somewhat
odd, given that policy is decided by a majority of seats, not a majority of
votes.
A possible explanation lies in a particular assumption underlying the cal-
culation of seat-shares from polls in CELIUS, namely that the party vote
registered in any monthly poll follows the geographical distribution from the
last election. Direct empirical evaluation of the assumption is not feasible
since monthly polls are drawn from a national sample that is unrepresenta-
tive when broken down by election districts. Nevertheless, assuming a stable
geographical distribution over 48 months at a time seems excessively restric-
tive. This is all the more so since the geographical distribution of the party
vote tends to change quite a bit over elections.
A more fundamental challenge is that seat-shares may respond quite violently
to minor changes in vote-shares. For example, transferring one percentage
point of the popular vote from the Labor party to the Conservative party in
the election of 2005, would induce a loss of ve Labor party seats. These
seats, however, would be distributed to the non-socialist parties with one seat
18
Model: I II III IV V VI VII
Seat-surpriset -.140
(.002)
Seat-surpriset -.274
Disagreement t (.049)
Vote-surpriset -.331
(.024)
Vote-surpriset -.660 -.581 -.581 -.703
Disagreement t (.051) (.093) (.093) (.047)
Dt(Election-12) .004
(.430)
Dt(Election-9) .004
(.411)
Dt(Election-6) .003
(.651)
Gov-changet .017 .022 .014 .020 .016 .025 .016
(.530) (.414) (.601) (.471) (.557) (.348) (.554)
Ut -.002 -.002 -.003 -.003 -.002 -.002 -.003
(.157) (.249) (.111) (.184) (.232) (.232) (.148)
Constant .009 .008 .012 .010 .010 .009 .010
(.252) (.359) (.162) (.241) (.230) (.261) (.211)
N 281 281 281 281 281 281 281
Log-L 586 573 586 573 573 573 573
Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates (p-values). Dependent variable: An-
nualized change in Norwegian unemployment rates. 48 months lagged an-
nualized change in Norwegian and G7 unemployment rates included but not
reported.
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each for the Christian Democratic Party and the Progress party, and three
seats for the Conservative Party. The example illustrates that aggregating
seat-shares from 19 electoral districts that use a complicated PR system,
may produce surprising results.23 Consequently, requiring agents to be able
to transform vote-shares from polls into consistent beliefs about the proba-
bility of a socialist majority in seats, may well be asking too much. Basing
beliefs directly on vote-shares may constitute a workable proxy for the agents.
Second, we notice from Table 2 that the products of the surprise variables and
the political disagreement variable have signs in accordance with the expec-
tations from RPT, and are signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional
levels (models II and IV). Thus, as before, unemployment accelerates after
a non-socialist surprise, and decelerates after a socialist surprise. However,
a higher level of disagreement now induces a greater change in the unem-
ployment growth for a given electoral surprise. As can be seen, the absolute
values of the coe¢ cients on the surprise variables are approximately doubled,
when multiplied by the level of disagreement (compare models I and II, and
models III and IV respectively). Since the average level of disagreement is
approximately 1=2 (c.f. Table 1), however, the coe¢ cient estimates of the
products are in broad agreement with the coe¢ cient estimates of the surprise
variables (models I and III).
Third, we observe that the pre-electoral dummies are not signicantly dif-
23The current system allocates seats by use of the St. Lägues method with 1.4 as rst
divisor in 19 electoral districts with magnitudes between 4 and 17 mandates. The rst
150 mandates are allocated in the electoral districts, while the last 19 mandates are allo-
cated on a national basis using the same formula. There is also pronounced geographical
disproportionality in the system, with the ratio [seat-share/vote-share] ranging from 0.8
to 1.4 over the electoral districts. The system has been subjected to various changes over
the period in question. Such changes are taken account of in CELIUS.
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ferent from zero at conventional levels in any of the specications of Table 2
(models V, VI and VII). Thus, once we check for the determinants of rational
partisan cycles, there is no indication of adaptive cycles of the opportunistic
kind.24
Finally, an interesting nding is that genuinely surprising changes in the
partisan composition of government do not signicantly alter the growth of
unemployment for any of the models in Table 2. We interpret this in the
following way: The crucial policies a¤ecting unemployment are e¤ectively
set by parliamentary majorities, indicating that parliament has overcome
agency problems in this policy area. We note that Alesina, Roubini and Co-
hen (1997:148-63) fail to nd statistically valid evidence of a Norwegian ra-
tional partisan cycle in quarterly unemployment data over the period 1972:1
- 1993:4. The authors employ a crude test with interventions that are turned
on in a specied number of quarters after a change in government, whether
such a change takes place in elections or not. Our ndings indicate that their
result may have been produced by a badly specied political variable that
confuses electoral surprise related to relevant majoritarian decision makers
with non-consequential changes in government.
What, then, are the substantive e¤ects of electoral surprises on unemploy-
ment growth? Figure 3 shows two di¤erences. First, the di¤erence between
the values predicted by model III and the values predicted by equation [13]
with no political variables included (votesurprise). Second, the di¤erence be-
tween the values predicted by model IV and the values predicted by equation
24Opportunistic cycles with adaptive expectations where originally conceived by Nord-
haus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976). Recent renements and tests are found in Clark and
Hallerberg (2000) for debt and monetary aggregates, and in Clark et al. (1998) for unem-
ployment and growth.
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[13] with no political variables included (votesurprise-disagreement). These
di¤erences convey the substantial e¤ects of policy surprises on unemploy-
ment.
[Figure 3 about here]
The strongest e¤ects are found after the elections of 1985 and 1993. About a
year after these elections (when policy starts to work), unemployment grows
by approximately 2 %, and thereafter gradually returns to trend (as con-
tracts are replaced). As is evident from Figure 2, both of these elections saw
sizeable socialist surprises (a vote share surprise of about 8 to10 %), while
the level of disagreement was fairly low.
The elections of 1989 and 1997 both saw moderate, and comparable, so-
cialist surprises (again calculated in vote-shares). While the 1997 election
was followed by an unemployment growth above 1 % a year after election,
no policy e¤ect is evident after the 1989 election. Figure 2 indicates why.
While the level of disagreement in the 1989 election was slightly below aver-
age, disagreements in the 1997 election reached the highest level in the period.
The elections of 1981 and 2001 where equally unsurprising (calculated in
vote-shares). The absence of a deviation between expectations and realiza-
tions in these elections hindered a partisan cycle in unemployment growth
(notwithstanding the fact that partisan di¤erences where quite pronounced
in the 2001 election).
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5 Conclusions
Tests of RPT in parliamentary systems have commonly assumed that the
authority to set policy in the macro-economic sphere rests with the govern-
ment. The present article questions this assumption on empirical grounds.
Having accounted for the electoral surprises relating to parliamentary majori-
ties, extra-electoral changes in the composition of governments add nothing
to the explanation of a Norwegian rational partisan cycle in unemployment
growth. A conjecture that should be put to the test is that the same holds
true for other parliamentary systems.
A possibility suggested by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995:249-53) is that vot-
ers engage in strategic balancing pitting a minority government against a
legislative majority, or voting in order to produce a multiparty government,
in order to create checks and balances that render mainpulation di¢ cult.
However, strategic voting in a proportional system like the Norwegian one is
unlikely to occur. Due to the complexities of the system, voters are likely to
cast their votes sincerely, and leave the composition of governments to the
elected representatives (Cox 1997). In support of this, controlling the regres-
sions for minority governments and coalition governments does not alter the
results presented.
Given that macro-economic policy is the domain of majorities in parlia-
mentary systems, agents expectations ought to be based on likely major-
ity winners in seats, not in votes. This is so simply because policy is set
by a majority in seats. However, our data does not support the conjecture
that voters form beliefs about likely majorities in seats. This nding may
certainly result from measurement errors in our seat-surprise variable. More
fundamentally, however, we contend that di¢ culties in forming consistent be-
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liefs about likely majority-seat winners are severe in multi-constituency PR
systems. Our conjecture is that rational agents may instead use vote-shares
from the polls as a proxy in forming such beliefs. More research should be
directed towards gaining a rmer understanding of belief formation in multi-
constituency PR systems.
A cornerstone in RPT is the implication that the more electoral alterna-
tives deviate in terms of policy preferences for a given electoral surprise, the
more should output and unemployment react to a change of policy makers.
Surprisingly, this implication has not been tested previously. Using disagree-
ment scores from Norwegian political history, we obtain support for this
important implication in our data. Thus, the magnitude of rational political
cycles is contingent on the disagreements between electoral alternatives. At
least this holds for uctuations in Norwegian unemployment growth since the
early 1980s. If this nding is general, as theory claims it is, electoral surprises
of comparable magnitudes could lead to widely di¤erent uctuations in real
variables like unemployment growth. Future research in RPT should explore
such contingencies.
This being said, there are several reasons why one might expect particular
political and institutional circumstances of Norway in the period analyzed
to drive results. First, compared to other countries Norway scores high on
general indexes of opposition inuence (Strøm 1990, Bingham Powell 2000).
Second, the Norwegian Storting has wide amendment powers in general, and
particulary in the scal budget (Helland 2000). Third, the committee sys-
tem of the Storting is strong compared to many western national assemblies
(Mattson & Strøm 1996, Bingham-Powell 2000). Qualications such as these,
of course, only strengthens the argument for including a parliamentary per-
spective in future research on RPT. It might well be that the real e¤ects of
24
electoral uncertainty about legislative majorities are weaker in countries with
stronger governments than the Norwegian one.
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Figure 1a: Socialist share of votes and probability of a socialist majority in votes. 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1975m1 1980m1 1985m1 1990m1 1995m1 2000m1 2005m1
period
soc_seatshare prsoc_seats
 
 
Figure 1b: Socialist share of seats and probability of a socialist majority in seats. 
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Figure 2: Surprise variables and partisan disagreement. 
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Figure 3: Effects of vote surprise and disagreement. Percentage change in annualized 
unemployment.  
 
 
